REMARKS:

Claims 2, 4-30, and 32-45 are currently pending in the application. Claims 2, 4-30,

and 32-45 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over U.S. Patent No. 5,787,000 to Lilly

et al. ("Lilly") in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,548,518 to Dietrich et al. ("Dietrich") and in

further view of U.S. Patent No. 5,111,391 to Fields et al. ("Fields").

Although the Applicants believe that claims 2, 4-30, and 32-45 are directed to

patentable subject matter and are in condition for allowance without amendment. The

Applicants have amended independent claims 2, 4, and 32 to more particularly point out

and distinctly claim the subject matter which the Applicants regard as the invention. By

making these amendments, the Applicants makes no admission concerning the merits of

the Examiner's rejection, and respectfully deny any statement or averment of the

Examiner not specifically addressed. Particularly, the Applicants reserve the right to file

additional claims in this Application or through a continuation patent Application of

substantially the same scope of originally filed claims 2, 4-30, and 32-45. No new matter

has been added.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a):

Claims 2, 4-30, and 32-45 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lilly in

view of *Dietrich* and in further view of *Fields*.

Although the Applicants believe that claims 2, 4-30, and 32-45 are directed to

patentable subject matter and are in condition for allowance without amendment. The

Applicants have amended independent claims 2, 4, and 32 to more particularly point out

and distinctly claim the subject matter which the Applicants regard as the invention. By

making these amendments, the Applicants do not indicate agreement with or

acquiescence to the Examiner's position with respect to the rejections of these claims

under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), as set forth in the Office Action.

The Applicants respectfully submit that *Lilly*, *Dietrich*, or *Fields* either individually or

in combination, fail to disclose, teach, or suggest each and every element of claims 2, 4-

Response to Final Office Action Attorney Docket No. 0544MH-36339 Serial No. 09/684,076 30, and 32-45. Thus, the Applicants respectfully traverse the Examiner's obvious rejection of claims 2, 4-30, and 32-45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the proposed combination of *Lilly*, *Dietrich*, or *Fields*, either individually or in combination.

The Proposed *Lilly-Dietrich-Fields* Combination Fails to Disclose, Teach, or Suggest Various Limitations Recited in Applicants Claims

For example, with respect to amended independent claim 2, this claim recites:

A method for scheduling development planning for a plurality of products of an enterprise, comprising:

receiving a list of a plurality of products to be developed:

receiving a list of required completion dates, each completion date specifying the completion date for the development of a corresponding product in the plurality of products;

receiving, for each product in the plurality of products, a project definition of a project for developing the product, each project definition defining:

a plurality of phases associated with the project for developing the product, the plurality of phases having a plurality of tasks required to complete a project for developing the product associated with the project definition; and

a list of resources required to complete each task defined in the product definition, at least one of the plurality of tasks for at least one of the plurality of projects requiring a material to be provided by an outside party distinct from the enterprise:

receiving a list of available resources, each resource in the list of available resources comprises:

a capacity level, representing a function of time available to each resource;

an availability level, representing a function of duration available to each resource; and

an ability level, including an attribute level, representing a function of work characteristic capable of being performed by each resource and a competency level, representing a function of competence of each resource;

receiving, for each task associated with each phase of the project definition requiring a resource, a specified minimum ability level of one or more resources to be used for that task;

receiving a list of materials available from outside parties distinct from the enterprise and a schedule of availability of the materials available from the outside parties; and

maintaining a scheduler operable to automatically generate a development schedule comprising all tasks for all projects, the

development schedule allocating the resources such that each resource is allocated at a level less than or equal to its capacity, the development schedule also allocating the resources that have an ability level at least as high as the specified minimum ability level, the development schedule also scheduling tasks that require materials from outside parties at a time when such materials will be available. (Emphasis Added).

Amended independent claims 4 and 32 recite similar limitations. Lilly, Dietrich, and Fields, either individually or in combination, fail to disclose each and every limitation of amended independent claims 2, 4, and 32.

The Applicants respectfully maintain that Lilly has nothing to do with amended independent claim 2 limitations regarding "scheduling development planning for a plurality of products of an enterprise" and in particular Lilly has nothing to do with amended independent claim 2 limitations regarding "receiving, for each product in the plurality of products, a project definition of a project for developing the product, each project definition defining: a plurality of phases associated with the project for developing the product, the plurality of phases having a plurality of tasks required to complete a project for developing the product associated with the project definition; and a list of resources required to complete each task defined in the product definition, at least one of the plurality of tasks for at least one of the plurality of projects requiring a material to be provided by an outside party distinct from the enterprise". Rather Lilly discloses a system for scheduling work orders in a manufacturing process. (Abstract). The work order scheduling of *Lilly* merely provides for a computerized schedule of specified operations to be performed in a manufacturing process. Lilly does not disclose, teach, or suggest "a plurality of phases associated with the project for developing the product." In addition, Lilly does not disclose, teach or suggest a "the plurality of phases having a plurality of tasks required to complete a project for developing the product associated with the project definition."

The Applicants further maintain that the Office Action acknowledges, and the Applicants agree, that *Lilly* fails to disclose the emphasized limitations noted above in

amended independent claim 2. Specifically the Examiner acknowledges that *Lilly* fails to disclose "receiving a list of materials available from outside parties distinct from the enterprise and a schedule of availability of the materials available form the outside parties" and "the development schedule also scheduling tasks that require materials from outside parties at a time when such materials will be available." (30 January 2006 Office Action, Page 6). However, the Examiner asserts that the cited portions of Dietrich disclose the acknowledged shortcomings in Lilly. The Applicants respectfully disagree. The Applicants respectfully traverse the Examiner's assertions regarding the subject matter disclosed in Dietrich.

The Applicants respectfully maintain that *Dietrich* has nothing to do with amended independent claim 2 limitations regarding "scheduling development planning for a plurality of products of an enterprise" and in particular Dietrich has nothing to do with amended independent claim 2 limitations regarding "receiving a list of materials available from outside parties distinct from the enterprise and a schedule of availability of the materials available form the outside parties" and "the development schedule also scheduling tasks that require materials from outside parties at a time when such materials will be available." Rather Dietrich discloses a system that correlates sufficient capacity or material availability to meet requirements. (Column 4, Dietrich merely discloses a comparison of the requirements through Lines 40-45). production and if these requirements are met, then the external availability schedule corresponds to the requirements. Dietrich does not disclose, teach, or suggest "receiving a list of materials available from outside parties distinct from the enterprise and a schedule of availability of the materials available form the outside parties" and "the development schedule also scheduling tasks that require materials from outside parties at a time when such materials will be available."

The Applicants respectfully maintain that the Office Action acknowledges, and the Applicants agree, that *Lilly* and *Dietrich* fail to disclose the emphasized limitations in amended independent claim 2. Specifically the Examiner acknowledges that the *Lilly* and *Dietrich* combination fails to disclose "the required resources having an ability level and each task specifying a minimum ability level of one or more resources to be

used for that task." (30 January 2006 Office Action, Pages 6-7). The Applicants noted in the previous response dated 2 November 2005, that (in the previous Office Action) the Examiner failed to cite any specific portion of *Fields* in support of the Examiner's position that *Fields* discloses the acknowledged shortcomings in *Lilly* and *Dietrich*. In response, the Examiner (in the present Office Action) asserts that "*Field* teaches tasks having a required skill level and also the employees having a skill level which are used to assign employees to tasks in Column 6, Lines 21-65. (30 January 2006 Office Action, Page 4). The Applicants respectfully disagree. The Applicants respectfully traverse the Examiner's assertions regarding the subject matter disclosed in *Fields*.

The Applicants respectfully maintain that *Fields* has nothing to do with amended independent claim 2 limitations regarding "scheduling development planning for a plurality of products of an enterprise" and in particular Fields has nothing to do with amended independent claim 2 limitations regarding "receiving a list of available resources, each resource in the list of available resources comprises: a capacity level, representing a function of time available to each resource; an availability level, representing a function of duration available to each resource; and an ability level, including an attribute level, representing a function of work characteristic capable of being performed by each resource and a competency level, representing a function of competence of each resource". In particular, it appears that the Examiner is equating "list of available resources" recited in amended independent claim 2 with the "Employee Schedule Record" disclosed in *Fields*. (30 January 2006 Office Action, Page 4). However, the "Employee Schedule Record" disclosed in *Fields* merely "contains one record per scheduled employee with that employee's name, skill level and the start-time and stop-time". (Column 6, Lines 21-65). In contrast, the "list of available resources" recited in amended independent claim 2 comprises "a capacity level, representing a function of time available to each resource; an availability level, representing a function of duration available to each resource; and an ability level, including an attribute level, representing a function of work characteristic capable of being performed by each resource and a competency level, representing a function of competence_of each resource". Thus, the Applicants respectfully submit that the equations forming the foundation of the Examiner's comparison between Fields and

amended independent claim 2 cannot be made. The Applicants further respectfully submit that these distinctions alone are sufficient to patentably distinguish amended independent along a factor.

independent claim 2 from Fields.

The Applicants further respectfully maintain that *Fields* has nothing to do with amended independent claim 2 limitations regarding "receiving, *for each task associated with each phase of the project definition requiring a resource, a specified minimum ability level of one or more resources to be used for that task".* Rather *Fields* discloses a staff scheduling data processing system. (Abstract). This data processing system in *Fields* is merely a database for storing and retrieving information associated with staff and management personal. Fields does not disclose, teach, or suggest "receiving, *for each task associated with each phase of the project definition requiring a resource, a specified minimum ability level of one or more resources to be used for that task".*

The Applicants respectfully submit that the Office Action has failed to properly establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness based on the proposed combination of *Lilly*, *Dietrich*, and *Fields*, either individually or in combination. The Office Action has not shown the required teaching, suggestion, or motivation in these references or in knowledge generally available to those of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine *Lilly*, *Dietrich*, and *Fields* as proposed. The Office Action merely states that "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to include *Fields* specification of a skill level for each task and subsequent skill levels of resources (employees) in order to more efficiently allocate each resource to a task." (30 January 2006 Office Action, Page 7). The Applicants respectfully disagree.

The Applicants further submit that this purported advantage relied on by the Examiner is nowhere disclosed, taught, or suggested in *Lilly*, *Dietrich*, or *Fields*, either individually or in combination. In essence, the Examiner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, would have been motivated because "by allocating based on required skill level, each task would be completed by the most qualified resource

thereby ensuring highest quality products." (30 January 2006 Office Action, Page 7). The Applicants respectfully disagree.

The Applicants do not understand the Examiner's assertion that "each task would be completed by the most qualified resource" or the Examiner's assertion of "ensuring highest quality products". The Applicants respectfully submit that each ability level, in the subject application, and as recited in amended independent claim 2, is provided for a minimum competency or experience level for the resource. So if for example, a higher competency resource is used for the task, the duration may be shortened by an amount proportional to the skill differential, likewise, if a lower competency resource is used for the task, the duration may be increased by an amount proportional to the skill differential. In essence, the change in duration based upon the competency is application dependent and is not the same as "*each task would be completed by the most qualified resource*" or even of "ensuring highest quality products". Thus, the Applicants respectfully request the Examiner to point to the portions of Lilly, Dietrich, or Fields which contain the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine Lilly, Dietrich, or Fields for the Examiner's stated purported advantage. The Applicants further submit that the Examiner is using the subject Application as a template to formulate reconstructive hindsight, which constitutes impermissible use of hindsight under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

A recent Federal Circuit case makes it crystal clear that, in an obviousness situation, the *prior art must disclose each and every element of the claimed invention, and that any motivation to combine or modify the prior art must be based upon a suggestion in the prior art.* In re Lee, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002). (Emphasis Added). Conclusory statements regarding common knowledge and common sense are insufficient to support a finding of obviousness. Id. at 1434-35. With respect to the subject Application, *the Examiner has not adequately supported the selection and combination of Lilly, Dietrich, and Fields to render obvious the Applicants claimed invention*. The Examiner's conclusory statements that it would have been obvious "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to include *Fields* specification of a skill level for each task and subsequent skill levels of resources (employees) in order to

more efficiently allocate each resource to a task" and that "by allocating based on required

skill level, each task would be completed by the most qualified resource thereby ensuring

highest quality products" do not adequately address the issue of motivation to

combine. (30 January 2006 Office Action, Page 7). This factual question of motivation is

material to patentability, and can not be resolved on subjective belief and unknown

authority. Id. It is improper, in determining whether a person of ordinary skill would have

been led to this combination of references, simply to "[use] that which the inventor taught

against its teacher." W.L. Gore v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Thus, the

Office Action fails to provide proper motivation for combining the teachings of Lilly,

Dietrich, or Fields, either individually or in combination.

The Proposed Lilly-Dietrich-Fields Combination Fails to Disclose, Teach, or Suggest

Various Limitations Recited in Applicants Claims

The Applicants respectfully submit that amended independent claims 2, 4, and 32

are considered patentably distinguishable over the proposed combination of Lilly, Dietrich,

and Fields. Lilly, Dietrich, and Fields do not disclose, suggest or even hint at the unique

and novel limitations disclosed in amended independent claims 2, 4, and 32. This being

the case, independent claims 2, 4, and 32 are considered patentably distinguishable over

the proposed combination of *Lilly*, *Dietrich*, and *Fields*.

With respect to dependent claims 5-30 and 33-45: claims 5-17 depend from

amended independent claim 2; claims 18-30 depend from amended independent claim 4;

and claims 33-45 depend from amended independent claim 32. As mentioned above,

each of amended independent claims 2, 4, and 32 are considered patentably

distinguishable over the proposed combination of Lilly, Dietrich, and Fields. Thus,

dependent claims 5-30 and 33-45 are considered to be in condition for allowance for at

least the reason of depending from an allowable claim.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Applicants submit that claims 2, 4-30 and 32-

45 are not rendered obvious by the proposed combination of Lilly, Dietrich, and Fields.

The Applicants further submit that claims 2, 4-30 and 32-45 are in condition for allowance.

Response to Final Office Action Attorney Docket No. 0544MH-36339 Serial No. 09/684,076 Thus, the Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claims 2, 4-30 and 32-45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) be reconsidered and that claims 2, 4-30 and 32-45 be allowed.

THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103:

To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, and not based on applicant's disclosure. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991); M.P.E.P. § 2142. Moreover, all the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art. In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 180 U.S.P.Q. 580 (CCPA 1974). If an independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988); M.P.E.P. § 2143.03.

With respect to alleged obviousness, there must be something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In fact, the absence of a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination. Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The mere fact that the prior art can be combined or modified does not make the resultant combination obvious unless the prior art also suggests the desirability of the combination. In re Mills, 916 F.2d 680, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990); M.P.E.P. § 2143.01. The consistent criterion for determining obviousness is whether the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that the process should be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success, viewed in the light of the prior art, not in the suggestion and the expectation of success must be founded in the prior art, not in the

Applicant's disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991; *In re O'Farrell*, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988); M.P.E.P. § 2142.

A recent Federal Circuit case makes it clear that, in an obviousness situation, the prior art must disclose each and every element of the claimed invention, and that any motivation to combine or modify the prior art must be based upon a suggestion in the prior art. *In re Lee*, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Conclusory statements regarding common knowledge and common sense are insufficient to support a finding of obviousness. *Id.* at 1434-35.

CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing amendments and remarks, this application is considered to be in condition for allowance, and early reconsideration and a Notice of Allowance are earnestly solicited.

Although Applicants believe no fees are deemed to be necessary; the undersigned hereby authorizes the Commissioner to charge any additional fees which may be required, or credit any overpayments, to **Deposit Account No. 500777**.

Please link this application to Customer No. 53184 so that its status may be checked via the PAIR System.

Respectfully submitted,

2/24/06 Date

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